In this article, we present some major lessons drawn from a recently completed research project. Our research dealt with ex-ante evaluation, mainly impact assessment (IA). We shed new light on research questions about the control of bureaucracy, the role of IA in decision-making, economics and policy learning, and the narrative dimension of appraisal. We identify how our findings stand in relation to conventional arguments about these issues, and reflect on their normative implications. We finally reason on the possible extensions of our arguments to the wider field of policy evaluation, connecting IA and ex-post evaluation.
In the late 1990s, the rare studies of ex-ante policy evaluation found it difficult to report on any concrete development within the European Commission outside financial planning and the structural funds. Take for example Pelkmans, Labory, Majone 2 who were unable to report on the number of fiches d'impact (the instrument used at the time to appraise the likely effects of policy proposals of the Commission), what they contained, and who was using them. But today this topic has gained a stable place on the research agenda of social scientists, for example in political science 3 and law. 4 As Smismans' notes in the introduction 1 The article arises out of original research funded by the European Research Council (ERC) project Analysis of Learning in Regulatory Governance (ALREG) (#230267). We thank Christie Smith for all her help in formatting the work and the editor of this special issue and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments made on earlier drafts of the work. The usual disclaimer applies.
to this volume, 5 nowadays research on ex-ante policy appraisal falls within the wider field of policy evaluation, broadly defined to cover the whole policy cycle -from ex-ante analysis to ex-post appraisal. On this core idea, the European Union (EU) is in synch with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD has recently adopted an integrated framework for policy evaluation 6 where several concepts and even indicators developed in the practice of ex-ante assessment are transferred to ex-post analysis, with the aim of encouraging a common evaluative approach to regulation and legislation more generally.
This reflects the politics of attention in regulatory evaluation: in the 1990s, only a few Member States were pushing a reluctant Commission to activate systematic initiatives for the integrated appraisal of EU legislation, be it ex-ante or ex-post. These years witnessed the emergence of the concepts of business impact assessment, compliance cost measurement, and better law-making, but there was no integrated response from the EU institutions. 7 Radaelli reviewed in 1999 the initiatives for ex-ante evaluation of policy Importantly, the process of carrying out an IA obliges the Commission to give empirical and conceptual reasons for policy choice -whether the Commission would have gone for the same choice with our without IA is not the fundamental issue.
Indeed this argument does not mean that the IA has limited usage. The IA has an effect after its publication, that is, post-decision. After its publication, the IA has a postdecisional role when it is used by the EP or later in the process by the European Court of Assessment Board", available on the Internet at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2761_en.htm (last accessed 30 January 2015).
Justice. by governments are carriers of specific economic ideas or economic theories. There is no doubt that economics is the main rationale evoked in the literature on ex-ante policy formulation. Actually it is exactly for this reason -that is, IA as vehicle of specific economic lenses on a wide range of policy issues -that ex-ante appraisal has been criticized by those who oppose the economic quantification of environmental issues, human rights and other types of policy problems.
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We suggest a different interpretation. True, policy instruments are carriers of economic ideas. But they also carry a view of the world which public managers face: this world can be a world of rational-synoptic agents, that scan a high number of options rootand-branches until the find the most efficient one, or a world of bounded rationality. Thus, alongside an economic worldview, policy instruments also contain a set of assumptions about how public managers learn from evidence.
In Coletti and Radaelli 43 we follow this dual approach (economic ideas and assumptions about learning) and argue that a given regulatory instrument contains both an economic robustness of the two instruments, IA should always be preferred to the SCM. The latter is concentrated on a narrow category of costs, 45 it does not look at benefits, and may lead to inefficient policy choices -simply put, economically wrong evaluations of option.
However, if we flip the coin and consider the robustness of the two policy instruments in terms of their learning models, the conclusion changes. Economically rudimentary forms of appraisals like the SCM contain more realistic and effective learning models than IA. In
Coletti and Radaelli 46 we explain how the SCM has triggered learning processes in some member states, leading to approaches to map the regulatory process from the point of view of the stakeholders, to the inclusion in regulatory reform programmes of stakeholders who had been at the margin until now, to stronger linkages between ICT initiatives in the public sector and regulatory reform, and to the consideration of wider compliance costs. The conclusion is straightforward: when we discuss whether an instrument for policy evaluation will work or not, we should consider both the robustness of its underlying economic ideas and its assumptions about learning and rationality.
The narrative components
Another way of looking at why regulators write IAs is to think about policies as theories. 47 A policy proposal is a set of hypothesis about cause-and-effect relations. It follows that IA is the place where these cause-and-effect relations are spelled out. In other words, the IA portrays the causal structure of a given policy proposal. Since they are used to 
III. Conclusion
In this article, we have reflected on a number of major findings from our recent project.
Whilst it is customary to think of IA as control instrument, our research suggests that this instrument may strengthen the bureaucracy in Brussels. We cannot say whether increased capacity for strategic and operational policy design and management within the Commission leads to autonomy and 'escape from control' -definitively we need more research on the usage of IAs by the EU institutions. In another article from our project, 51 we have made the case for 'equifinality': different concatenations of variables lead to outcomes like 'control'
and 'learning' -hence we need a nuanced perspective on these questions.
We have also qualified the decisional role of IA. The latter contributes to the decisionmaking process, but its merit over time is most likely to lay out arguments and evidence that can be used after the decision is taken, by the EP, Courts, stakeholders and perhaps the same bureaucracies that generates the original IA and go back to the same issue years later 50 Laura Cram, "Governance 'to Go': Domestic Actors, Institutions and the Boundaries of the Throughout the article, we have supported our modifications of propositions and interpretations that are quite diffuse in the debate on ex-ante evaluation -a sort of conventional wisdom. Thus, why did we find that the conventional interpretative lens may be wrong? One reason is the logic of scientific inquiry. The vast majority of research that defined the 'theory' of IA in the early days was produced by scholars with data from the US case. It is sensible to suggest that some conclusions drawn on the US case may not be valid when we consider Europe. What we thought was a general theoretical argument about IA was instead a local theory, valid only in certain places and times.
Another reason is the role played by international organisations and policy-makers in distilling lessons and conventional propositions that assist their communication, the design of guidance for IA, training and the diffusion of economic analysis in government and at the Commission. Because of these objectives (diffusion, training, communication, implementation), complex causal phenomena are reduced to simple propositions that can be somewhat 'sloganized'. Some of them have intuitive value, like the logic of best practice, and are heuristically attractive. With this article we have shown the dangers of relying on assumptions that are not exposed to critical empirical and theoretical challenge.
One question for the readers of this special issue is whether the arguments we aired can be extended to the ex-post evaluation of legislation. Obviously while the Commission has produced IAs for more than a decade, the experience of the Commission with legislative evaluation carried out ex-post is much more fragmentary and we lack a body of empirical research. We can only talk at the conceptual level. Conceptually, indeed, if appraisals strengthen the bureaucracy instead of controlling it, the argument could apply to both exante and ex-post. The observations about the decisional role of evaluations can extend to ex-post -the Commission may not use evaluations to terminate legislation but there may be other effects on the decisional process and post-decisional effects. The remarks on narration and best practice are conceptually transferrable to the ex-post phase of evaluation, and learning may impact on economic models' usage both in the ex-ante and the ex-post case. Of course, this does not suggest any conclusion absent empirical analysisbut it invites an integrated research agenda for the whole life cycle of evaluation.
